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On	  the	  40th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  publication	  of	  Richard	  Dawkins’s	  The	  Selfish	  Gene,	  
we	  explore	  the	  origins	  of	  cynical,	  strategic	  thinking	  in	  evolutionary	  biology,	  
investigate	  how	  this	  illuminated	  the	  sexual	  and	  social	  lives	  of	  animals,	  and	  assess	  
Dawkins’s	  suggestion	  that	  evolution	  is	  best	  understood	  by	  taking	  the	  gene’s-­‐eye	  
view.	  	  	  Introduction	  	  	  Richard	  Dawkins’s	  The	  Selfish	  Gene	  (Dawkins,	  1976),	  now	  entering	  its	  fifth	  decade,	  was	  unequivocally	  the	  most	  important	  popular	  book	  on	  evolutionary	  biology	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  It	  describes	  a	  revolutionary	  approach	  to	  animal	  behavior	  that	  was	  storming	  the	  academic	  community,	  wiping	  out	  the	  conceptually	  bankrupt	  ‘‘group	  selectionist’’	  thinking	  that	  had	  come	  to	  dominate	  much	  of	  biology	  and	  opening	  up	  new	  vistas	  for	  exciting	  scientific	  enquiry.	  Unlike	  many	  works	  of	  popular	  science	  that	  give	  the	  impression	  of	  providing	  the	  last	  word	  on	  a	  topic,	  Dawkins’s	  book	  reads	  as	  an	  entry	  point	  into	  a	  much	  larger	  discussion	  and	  encourages	  the	  reader	  to	  join	  the	  conversation.	  This	  reader	  did	  exactly	  that:	  I	  can	  point	  to	  Dawkins’s	  book	  as	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  study	  and	  pursue	  a	  career	  in	  evolutionary	  biology.	  And,	  as	  numerous	  conversations	  with	  school	  pupils,	  undergraduates,	  and	  PhD	  students	  have	  shown	  me,	  it	  continues	  to	  pull	  in	  new	  recruits	  to	  this	  day.	  	  	  Here,	  I	  will	  consider	  three	  aspects	  of	  this	  landmark	  publication.	  First,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  prehistory	  and	  context	  of	  the	  ‘‘strategic	  revolution’’	  that	  provides	  the	  substantive	  core	  of	  Dawkins’s	  book.	  This	  fastens	  attention	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  biological	  entities	  as	  agents	  employing	  strategies	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  conflicting	  agendas	  and	  emphasizes	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  clear	  as	  to	  which	  entities	  manifest	  agency	  and	  what	  they	  are	  striving	  to	  achieve.	  Second,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  this	  revolution	  was	  changing	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  animal	  behavior,	  providing	  simple	  explanations	  for	  general	  patterns	  observed	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  unveiling	  hitherto	  unappreciated	  battlegrounds	  and	  suites	  of	  fascinating	  adaptations.	  Third,	  I	  will	  assess	  Dawkins’s	  particular	  suggestion	  that	  we	  must	  focus	  on	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  gene	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  animal	  behavior,	  and	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  selfish-­‐gene	  theory	  and	  intragenomic	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  	  	  The	  Good	  of	  the	  Group	  	  	  The	  core	  feature	  of	  life	  is	  its	  apparent	  purposefulness.	  Prior	  to	  Charles	  Darwin,	  this	  had	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  work	  of	  deities,	  but	  the	  theory	  of	  natural	  selection	  made	  clear	  how	  the	  appearance	  of	  design	  could	  instead	  emerge	  automatically	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  heritable	  traits	  having	  differential	  impact	  upon	  their	  bearers’	  
reproductive	  success.	  Strangely,	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  this	  central	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  scientific	  discovery	  was	  almost	  completely	  neglected	  by	  popu-­‐	  lation	  geneticists,	  who	  treated	  natural	  selection	  as	  just	  another	  evolutionary	  force	  without	  any	  special	  importance.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  little	  formal	  clarity	  on	  issues	  of	  adaptive	  evolution	  and	  the	  question	  of	  which	  biological	  entity	  was	  supposed	  to	  manifest	  design	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  	  	  A	  key	  exception	  was	  R.A.	  Fisher,	  whose	  masterpiece	  The	  Genetical	  Theory	  of	  
Natural	  Selection	  (Fisher,	  1999)	  emphasized	  that	  it	  is	  individual	  organisms	  who	  become	  adapted,	  as	  shown	  by	  his	  ‘‘fundamental	  theorem	  of	  natural	  selection.’’	  In	  the	  1958	  edition	  of	  his	  book,	  Fisher	  included	  a	  section	  on	  ‘‘the	  benefit	  of	  species,’’	  emphasizing	  that	  any	  benefit	  of	  adaptation	  to	  the	  species	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  purely	  incidental.	  But	  the	  general	  assumption	  among	  population	  geneticists	  was	  that	  better	  allelic	  variants	  make	  for	  better	  bodies	  that	  make	  for	  better	  populations.	  They	  supposed	  that	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  ‘‘better’’	  should	  mean	  may	  be	  of	  philosophical	  interest	  but	  of	  little	  consequence	  for	  science.	  	  	  However,	  purpose	  is	  inescapable	  in	  biology,	  and	  many	  of	  its	  subdisciplines	  are	  motivated	  and	  organized	  according	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  functional,	  adaptive	  rationale	  underpinning	  biological	  structures.	  Consequently,	  the	  vacuum	  created	  by	  the	  population	  geneticists	  led	  to	  the	  insidious	  establishment	  of	  a	  pseudoscientific	  ‘‘group	  selectionism’’	  that	  explained	  away	  all	  biological	  traits	  as	  functioning	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  species.	  Thus,	  reproduction	  and	  parental	  care	  were	  interpreted	  as	  being	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  species,	  as	  was	  the	  industry	  of	  sterile	  workers	  in	  social-­‐insect	  societies	  and	  the	  gentlemanly	  antler-­‐locking	  rituals	  of	  stags	  deciding	  access	  to	  does.	  By	  giving	  the	  impression	  of	  providing	  an	  explanatory	  framework	  that	  readily	  accommodated	  such	  phenomena	  without	  further	  investigative	  work	  needing	  to	  be	  undertaken,	  group	  selectionism	  opp-­‐	  osed	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  biological	  sciences.	  	  	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  culminated	  in	  the	  1962	  publication	  of	  Vero	  Wynne-­‐Ed-­‐	  wards’s	  book	  Animal	  Dispersion	  in	  Relation	  to	  Social	  Behavior	  (Wynne-­‐Edwards,	  1962).	  Wynne-­‐Edwards	  documented	  various	  fecundity-­‐modulating	  behaviors	  ac-­‐	  ross	  the	  animal	  kingdom,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  bird	  populations,	  which	  he	  interpreted	  as	  group-­‐level	  adaptations	  for	  regulating	  population	  density.	  He	  regarded	  the	  individual	  as	  exercising	  reproductive	  self-­‐restraint	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  overstretching	  resources	  and	  hence	  ensure	  continued	  population	  survival.	  	  	  The	  explicitness	  with	  which	  Wynne-­‐Edwards	  framed	  his	  account	  within	  the	  group-­‐selectionist	  mode	  of	  thinking	  provided	  a	  foil	  against	  which	  George	  Williams	  was	  able	  to	  launch	  an	  attack	  against	  this	  pseudoscientific	  paradigm,	  with	  his	  1966	  book	  Adaptation	  and	  Natural	  Selection	  (Williams,	  1966).	  Dawkins	  relates	  Williams’s	  key	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  group	  selectionism	  doesn’t	  add	  up:	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  individual	  selflessness	  would	  promote	  the	  health	  of	  the	  population,	  if	  selfish	  individuals	  enjoy	  greater	  reproductive	  success,	  then	  they	  will	  be	  favored	  by	  natural	  selection,	  such	  that	  adaptations	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  promote	  the	  fitness	  of	  the	  population	  but	  must	  instead	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  advantage.	  	  
As	  highlighted	  by	  the	  title	  of	  his	  book,	  Dawkins	  descends	  lower	  in	  the	  biological	  hierarchy	  to	  locate	  adaptive	  agency	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  gene.	  He	  conceptualizes	  individual	  organisms	  as	  ‘‘gene	  machines,’’	  built	  by	  the	  genes	  to	  transmit	  copies	  of	  themselves	  to	  future	  generations.	  However,	  he	  makes	  clear	  that	  this	  view	  of	  adaptation	  is	  philosophically	  rather	  than	  scientifically	  motivated	  and	  suggests	  that,	  whether	  we	  view	  the	  gene	  or	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  strategic	  agent,	  we	  will	  always	  derive	  the	  same	  empirical	  predictions.	  I’ll	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  later	  in	  this	  essay	  but	  for	  now	  will	  focus	  on	  how	  evolutionary	  biology	  was	  transformed	  by	  thinking	  carefully	  about	  the	  individual’s—	  or	  gene	  machine’s—advantage.	  	  	  Individual	  Advantage	  	  	  The	  strategic,	  individualistic	  view	  of	  evolution	  provided	  greater	  illumination	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  adaptive	  phenomena	  that	  were	  previously	  inexplicable	  from	  a	  group-­‐selectionist	  perspective,	  immediately	  suggesting	  simple	  and	  direct	  explanations	  for	  many	  patterns	  observed	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  Moreover,	  with	  the	  new	  understanding	  that	  appeals	  to	  the	  good	  of	  the	  group	  are	  untenable,	  there	  was	  a	  job	  to	  be	  done	  to	  explain	  apparently	  selfless	  behaviors	  that	  appeared	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  Darwinian	  view	  of	  survival	  of	  the	  fittest.	  Dawkins’s	  account	  of	  this	  revolutionary	  work	  is	  framed	  in	  his	  language	  of	  gene	  machines,	  but	  he	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  researchers	  in	  question	  would	  not	  use	  or	  even	  agree	  with	  this	  language,	  preferring	  to	  think	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  a	  free	  agent	  in	  her	  own	  right.	  	  	  One	  topic	  particularly	  revolutionized	  by	  the	  strategic	  view	  was	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  sexes.	  Much	  of	  this	  understanding	  had	  been	  anticipated	  by	  Darwin,	  but	  these	  ideas	  were	  now	  given	  extra	  precision	  and	  predictive	  power.	  Geoff	  Parker	  and	  colleagues	  (Parker	  et	  al.,	  1972)	  developed	  mathematical	  models	  showing	  how,	  in	  ‘‘isogamous’’	  populations	  in	  which	  all	  sex	  cells	  are	  initially	  of	  the	  same	  size,	  selection	  will	  simultaneously	  favor	  small,	  motile	  sex	  cells	  that	  selfishly	  exploit	  the	  resources	  carried	  by	  their	  mating	  partners	  and	  large,	  resource-­‐laden	  sex	  cells	  that	  compensate	  for	  this	  exploitation,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  male	  versus	  female	  reproductive	  tactics.	  The	  very	  origin	  of	  the	  sexes	  was	  now	  explicable	  within	  this	  paradigm	  of	  cynical	  and	  selfish	  strategizing.	  	  	  From	  this	  basic	  asymmetry	  in	  resource	  investment	  would	  spring	  many	  other	  sex	  differences.	  Robert	  Trivers	  (Trivers,	  1972)	  showed	  how	  the	  greater	  investment	  of	  resources	  made	  by	  females	  should	  render	  them	  less	  willing	  to	  abandon	  a	  current	  offspring	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  future	  reproductive	  success	  and	  hence	  leave	  them	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  deserted	  by	  their	  mates	  and	  left	  holding	  the	  baby.	  This	  explained	  the	  scarcity	  of	  paternal	  care	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  Moreover,	  intense	  sexual	  selection	  experienced	  by	  males	  to	  secure	  as	  many	  mating	  partners	  as	  possible	  explained	  extravagant	  and	  costly	  ornaments	  such	  as	  the	  peacock’s	  tail.	  Here,	  Dawkins	  discusses	  Fisher’s	  (Fisher,	  1999)	  suggestion	  that	  these	  are	  the	  products	  of	  a	  runaway	  process	  whereby,	  so	  long	  as	  an	  ornament	  is	  preferred	  by	  females	  in	  general,	  all	  females	  are	  favored	  to	  mate	  with	  ornamented	  males	  in	  order	  that	  their	  sons	  be	  similarly	  ornamented,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  unconducive	  to	  their	  survival,	  so	  that	  they	  may	  attract	  mating	  partners.	  And	  he	  contrasts	  this	  with	  Amotz	  Zahavi’s	  (Zahavi,	  1975)	  view	  that	  the	  ornament	  instead	  functions	  as	  a	  
signal	  of	  male	  quality	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  so	  burdensome.	  Either	  way,	  such	  cumbersome	  ornaments	  highlight	  that	  selection	  is	  not	  simply	  concerned	  with	  the	  individual’s	  survival	  but	  also	  their	  reproductive	  success	  and	  that	  wasteful	  extravagance	  may	  prevail	  so	  long	  as	  it	  gives	  a	  selfish,	  competitive	  advantage.	  	  	  A	  further	  refinement	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  fitness	  would	  make	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  distinct	  from	  fecundity	  and	  that	  individuals	  who	  produce	  more	  offspring	  may	  actually	  have	  fewer	  descendants	  in	  the	  long	  run	  if	  this	  leaves	  them	  with	  fewer	  resources	  to	  invest	  into	  parental	  care.	  Here,	  Dawkins	  celebrates	  the	  work	  of	  David	  Lack	  (Lack,	  1954),	  whose	  studies	  of	  clutch	  size	  in	  wild	  birds	  showed	  that,	  indeed,	  rather	  than	  more	  eggs	  always	  translating	  into	  more	  surviving	  chicks,	  there	  is	  instead	  an	  optimal	  number	  of	  eggs	  that	  maximizes	  the	  number	  of	  offspring	  surviving	  to	  adulthood.	  Lack	  also	  showed	  that,	  under	  resource	  scarcity,	  the	  optimal	  clutch	  size	  may	  be	  rather	  smaller	  than	  under	  plenitude.	  Accordingly,	  individuals	  may	  be	  favored	  to	  voluntarily	  curb	  their	  fecundity	  in	  times	  of	  dearth.	  Here	  was	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  self-­‐restraint	  described	  by	  Wynne-­‐Edwards,	  framed	  entirely	  in	  terms	  of	  strategic,	  individual	  advantage.	  	  	  But	  could	  the	  strategic	  view	  of	  individual	  advantage	  explain	  cooperation?	  Dawkins	  discusses	  the	  work	  of	  Trivers,	  John	  Maynard	  Smith,	  and	  George	  Price,	  showing	  that	  cooperative	  behavior	  can	  be	  favored	  when	  individuals	  react	  against	  each	  other.	  Trivers	  (Trivers,	  1971)	  developed	  the	  theory	  of	  reciprocity	  (or	  ‘‘if	  you	  scratch	  my	  back,	  I’ll	  scratch	  yours’’)	  to	  show	  how	  a	  cooperative	  act	  may	  be	  costly	  in	  the	  short	  term	  but	  may	  nevertheless	  improve	  the	  individual’s	  lifetime	  reproductive	  success	  if	  it	  elicits	  extra	  cooperation	  from	  her	  social	  partners.	  Maynard	  Smith	  and	  Price	  (Maynard	  Smith	  and	  Price,	  1973),	  developing	  the	  eco-­‐	  nomic	  ‘‘theory	  of	  games’’	  for	  application	  to	  behavioral	  ecology,	  showed	  that	  frequency-­‐dependent	  selection	  could	  maintain	  cooperation,	  even	  if	  cheats	  enjoy	  a	  fitness	  advantage	  when	  rare,	  and	  emphasized	  ‘‘retaliator’’	  strategies	  whereby	  otherwise	  cooperative	  individuals	  meet	  aggression	  with	  aggression	  in	  a	  manner	  reminiscent	  of	  Trivers’s	  reciprocators.	  This	  reveals	  that	  cooperation	  can	  indeed	  result	  from	  strategic	  self-­‐interest.	  	  	  What	  about	  altruism,	  whereby	  a	  behavior	  actually	  reduces	  the	  actor’s	  lifetime	  reproductive	  success?	  Dawkins	  shows	  that	  this,	  too,	  can	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  self-­‐interest,	  provided	  that	  we	  rethink	  what	  it	  is	  the	  individual	  wants.	  Hamilton’s	  (Hamilton,	  1964)	  theory	  of	  ‘‘inclusive	  fitness’’	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  transmit	  her	  heritable	  traits	  to	  future	  generations	  not	  only	  through	  personal	  reproduction,	  but	  also	  by	  promoting	  the	  reproductive	  success	  of	  her	  relatives,	  with	  whom	  she	  shares	  heritable	  traits	  in	  common.	  This	  insight	  revealed	  that	  altruistic	  behavior	  that	  reduces	  the	  actor’s	  direct	  fitness	  may	  be	  favored	  by	  natural	  selection	  so	  long	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  benefit	  to	  individuals	  who	  are	  sufficiently	  related	  to	  the	  altruist.	  This	  is	  altruism,	  though	  of	  a	  cynical,	  nepotistic	  flavor.	  Hamilton’s	  theory	  provides	  no	  basis	  for	  thinking	  organisms	  will	  ever	  behave	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  species	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  The	  precision	  of	  strategic	  agenda	  becomes	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interaction	  between	  relatives,	  where	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  nepotistic	  altruism	  but	  also	  the	  possibility	  of	  conflict.	  Trivers	  (Trivers,	  1974)	  investigated	  a	  particularly	  
striking	  instance	  of	  such	  tension,	  between	  parent	  and	  offspring	  whom,	  despite	  sharing	  half	  of	  their	  heritable	  constitution	  in	  common,	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  embroiled	  in	  extreme	  conflicts	  of	  interests.	  For	  instance,	  a	  mother	  may	  have	  some	  optimal	  amount	  of	  her	  reproductive	  resources	  that	  she	  will	  want	  to	  invest	  into	  her	  son,	  holding	  back	  the	  remainder	  for	  her	  future	  reproduction.	  But	  her	  son	  values	  his	  own	  future	  reproductive	  success	  more	  than	  he	  does	  his	  mother’s	  and,	  accordingly,	  is	  favored	  to	  extract	  more	  investment	  from	  her.	  Dawkins	  discusses	  manipulative	  begging	  and	  other	  postnatal	  behaviors,	  but	  such	  parent-­‐offspring	  conflict	  may	  occur	  even	  before	  birth,	  with	  the	  fetus	  engaging	  in	  physiological	  warfare	  to	  drain	  his	  mother’s	  blood	  stream	  of	  nutrients	  for	  his	  own	  use.	  The	  hardships	  of	  pregnancy	  and	  the	  battle	  of	  wills	  that	  is	  the	  daily	  reality	  of	  parents	  of	  young	  children	  are	  placed	  in	  a	  new,	  evolutionary	  light.	  	  	  The	  Gene’s	  Eye	  View	  	  	  This	  revolutionary	  science	  was	  framed	  by	  these	  researchers	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  advantage.	  However,	  Williams	  and	  Hamilton	  did	  also	  toy	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  seeing	  the	  gene,	  rather	  than	  the	  individual,	  as	  the	  strategic	  agent.	  In	  1972,	  Hamilton	  (Hamilton,	  1972)	  took	  a	  short	  diversion	  from	  an	  account	  of	  inclusive	  fitness	  to	  imagine	  an	  intelligent	  gene	  deliberating	  as	  to	  which	  alternative	  behaviors	  of	  its	  carrier	  would	  lead	  to	  more	  of	  its	  copies	  being	  transmitted	  to	  future	  generations.	  Dawkins	  elaborates	  this	  idea	  so	  that	  it	  comes	  to	  underpin	  his	  entire	  book,	  with	  the	  strategic	  revolution	  being	  couched	  in	  explicitly	  gene-­‐centric	  language.	  But	  why	  does	  he	  do	  this,	  and	  is	  the	  approach	  successful?	  	  	  Dawkins	  gives	  two	  main	  reasons	  for	  identifying	  the	  gene	  as	  the	  strategic	  agent.	  First	  is	  the	  idea	  that,	  although	  the	  individual	  has	  only	  a	  fleeting	  existence	  over	  timescales	  appropriate	  to	  evolutionary	  change,	  the	  gene	  is	  potentially	  immortal.	  Second,	  he	  regards	  as	  axiomatic	  the	  idea	  that	  natural	  selection	  inevitably	  favors	  selfishness,	  such	  that	  altruistic	  behavior	  of	  individuals	  must	  be	  considered	  illusory	  and	  driven	  instead	  by	  more	  fundamental,	  selfish	  agendas.	  	  	  I	  find	  neither	  of	  these	  arguments	  particularly	  persuasive.	  With	  respect	  to	  time-­‐	  scales,	  the	  central	  feature	  of	  Darwin’s	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  explains	  adaptive	  design,	  and	  this	  adaptive	  design	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now	  and	  is	  packaged	  into	  units	  that	  we	  recognize	  as	  individual	  organisms.	  It	  is	  the	  individual	  organism	  that	  we	  actually	  see	  striving	  to	  maximize	  inclusive	  fitness,	  so	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  seek	  adaptive	  explanations	  from	  this	  perspective.	  And	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  axiom	  of	  selfishness,	  I	  cannot	  see	  why	  selfishness	  should	  take	  conceptual	  precedence	  over	  altruism.	  Ironically,	  Dawkins’s	  argument	  is	  analogous	  to	  that	  of	  the	  group	  selectionists	  whom	  he	  was	  railing	  against.	  While	  they	  sought	  to	  explain	  individual-­‐level	  altruism	  by	  appealing	  to	  group-­‐level	  selfishness,	  he	  seeks	  to	  explain	  it	  by	  appealing	  to	  gene-­‐level	  selfishness.	  More	  generally,	  the	  altruistic	  individual	  and	  the	  selfish	  gene	  are	  metaphors	  that	  can	  only	  be	  judged	  according	  to	  their	  empirical	  usefulness,	  and	  if,	  as	  Dawkins	  suggests,	  they	  always	  yield	  the	  very	  same	  testable	  predictions,	  then	  neither	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  being	  ‘‘more	  correct.’’	  	  	  
I	  also	  find	  Dawkins’s	  discussion	  of	  selfish	  genes	  somewhat	  inconsistent	  and	  often	  vague.	  When	  most	  focused	  on	  the	  biology,	  he	  speaks	  of	  genes	  as	  if	  they	  are	  physical	  scraps	  of	  DNA	  residing	  in	  the	  bodies	  of	  living	  organisms.	  But	  when	  being	  more	  philosophical,	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  this	  is	  not	  what	  he	  means	  and	  that	  the	  gene	  is	  instead	  a	  distributed	  agent	  that	  simultaneously	  encompasses	  all	  identical	  copies	  in	  the	  population.	  That	  is,	  the	  hero	  of	  Dawkins’s	  book	  is	  actually	  the	  selfish	  allele.	  The	  allele’s-­‐eye	  view	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  Dawkins	  to	  main-­‐	  tain	  his	  focus	  on	  selfishness:	  whereas	  the	  physical	  scrap	  of	  DNA—like	  a	  minia-­‐	  ture	  organism—is	  favored	  to	  maximize	  its	  inclusive	  fitness	  (Gardner	  and	  Welch,	  2011),	  for	  example,	  by	  providing	  altruistic	  aid	  to	  other	  scraps	  of	  DNA	  with	  whom	  it	  has	  some	  probability	  of	  sharing	  identity	  by	  descent,	  the	  allele	  is	  locked	  in	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  of	  gene-­‐pool	  frequencies	  that	  ensures	  success	  is	  synonymous	  with	  selfishness.	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  is	  the	  most	  useful	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  evolu-­‐	  tion,	  and	  indeed,	  I	  believe	  it	  has	  actually	  obscured	  some	  interesting	  biology.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  big	  disappointment	  of	  The	  Selfish	  Gene	  is	  that	  Dawkins	  doesn’t	  use	  this	  concept	  to	  explore	  intragenomic	  conflict.	  The	  genome	  is	  a	  battlefield	  of	  conflicting	  interests	  that	  simply	  cannot	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  advantage	  and	  must	  be	  interpreted	  from	  the	  gene’s-­‐eye	  view	  (Burt	  and	  Trivers,	  2006).	  Dawkins	  would	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  several	  examples	  of	  such	  intragenomic	  conflict,	  including	  meiotic	  drivers	  and	  sex-­‐ratio-­‐distorting	  sex	  chromosomes,	  and	  many	  more	  have	  subsequently	  come	  to	  light	  following	  his	  book’s	  publication.	  I	  find	  it	  strange	  that	  such	  phenomena	  are	  overlooked	  in	  a	  book	  that	  is	  ostensibly	  about	  selfish	  genes.	  (Some	  measures	  are	  taken	  to	  address	  this	  in	  later	  editions.)	  	  	  In	  several	  places	  in	  his	  book,	  Dawkins	  comes	  tantalizingly	  close	  to	  identifying	  situations	  in	  which	  intragenomic	  conflicts	  may	  arise,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  truly	  embrace	  the	  gene’s-­‐eye	  view	  and	  instead	  continues	  with	  standard,	  individual-­‐level	  ‘‘gene	  machine’’	  thinking.	  For	  instance,	  in	  explicating	  the	  (now	  largely	  discredited)	  ‘‘haplodiploidy	  hypothesis’’	  for	  insect	  eusociality,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  female	  hymenopterans	  are	  more	  related	  to	  their	  full	  sisters	  via	  their	  paternal-­‐origin	  genes	  than	  via	  their	  maternal-­‐origin	  genes,	  on	  account	  of	  their	  father	  having	  only	  one	  haploid	  genome	  to	  pass	  on	  to	  his	  daughters.	  Explicit	  consideration	  of	  the	  gene’s	  interests	  would	  therefore	  suggest	  that,	  if	  a	  female’s	  genes	  had	  information	  regarding	  their	  parent	  of	  origin,	  her	  paternal-­‐origin	  genes	  would	  place	  more	  value	  upon	  her	  sisters	  and	  would	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  have	  the	  female	  enact	  altruism	  toward	  them,	  whereas	  her	  maternal-­‐origin	  genes	  would	  place	  a	  lower	  relatedness	  valuation	  upon	  her	  sisters	  and	  would	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  altruism.	  	  	  Such	  intralocus	  parent-­‐of-­‐origin	  conflict	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  David	  Haig’s	  ‘‘kinship	  theory	  of	  genomic	  imprinting’’	  (Haig,	  2002),	  which	  may	  explain	  why	  some	  genes	  are	  consistently	  silenced	  when	  inherited	  from	  one	  parent	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  Had	  Dawkins	  really	  had	  his	  eye	  on	  the	  gene’s	  interests,	  he	  might	  have	  anticipated	  this	  exciting	  development	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  inclusive	  fitness—and	  the	  explosion	  of	  interest	  in	  intragenomic	  conflicts	  more	  generally.	  Was	  this	  simply	  a	  lack	  of	  imagination	  on	  his	  part?	  No.	  I	  think	  Dawkins’s	  focus	  on	  the	  selfish	  allele	  may	  
have	  been	  a	  barrier	  to	  him	  noticing	  this	  potential	  conflict.	  While	  physical	  scraps	  of	  DNA	  of	  maternal	  origin	  may	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  physical	  scraps	  of	  DNA	  of	  paternal	  origin,	  owing	  to	  differences	  in	  relatedness,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  frame	  such	  conflict	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  divergent	  interests	  of	  competing	  alleles,	  as	  the	  allele	  does	  not	  have	  a	  parent	  of	  origin.	  	  	  Conclusions	  	  	  Dawkins’s	  The	  Selfish	  Gene	  has	  captured	  the	  imagination	  of	  generations	  of	  budding	  evolutionary	  biologists,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  public.	  Even	  if	  some	  details	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  scrutiny,	  its	  overall	  message	  remains	  both	  insightful	  and	  timeless.	  Its	  enduring	  appeal	  lies	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  overturns	  folk	  wisdom	  on	  the	  harmony	  of	  nature,	  exposing	  the	  cynical	  tensions,	  all-­‐out	  warfare,	  and	  occasional	  glimmers	  of	  true	  altruism	  in	  the	  sexual	  and	  social	  lives	  of	  animals	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  both	  shocking	  and	  yet	  also	  profoundly	  resonant	  with	  everyday	  human	  experience.	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